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Abstract
In this paper we address Approximate Agreement problem in the Mobile Byzantine faults model.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we propose the the first mapping from the existing variants of
Mobile Byzantine models to the Mixed-Mode faults model.This mapping further help us to prove the
correctness of class MSR (Mean-Subsequence-Reduce) Approximate Agreement algorithms in the Mo-
bile Byzantine fault model, and is of independent interest. Secondly, we prove lower bounds for solving
Approximate Agreement under all existing Mobile Byzantine faults models. Interestingly, these lower
bounds are different from the static bounds. Finally, we propose matching upper bounds.
Our paper is the first to link the Mobile Byzantine Faults models and the Mixed-Mode Faults models,
and we advocate that a similar approach can be adopted in order to prove the correctness of other classical
distributed building blocks (e.g. agreement, clock synchronization, interactive consistency etc) under
Mobile Byzantine Faults model.
1 Introduction
The emergent area of sensor networks or mobile robot networks revived recently the research on one of the
most studied building blocks of distributed computing: Approximate Agreement [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Indeed, gathering environmental data such as temperature or atmospheric pressure, or synchronizing clocks
in large scale sensor networks, typically do not require perfect agreement between participating nodes. Also,
requiring autonomous mobile robots to gather at some specific location e.g. to communicate or to setup a
new task tolerates a difference in the final robot positions after gathering. This is due to the robots physical
size. Accepting a predetermined difference in the agreement process permits to avoid many impossibility
results occurring in the perfect agreement case.
The Approximate Agreement problem [10, 11, 12] is nevertheless complex to solve in systems prone
to Byzantine faults. In sensor networks, sensors may not transmit their values or may transmit erroneous
values due to permanent or temporary failures. In mobile autonomous robot networks, some robots may
move in the opposite direction as the one intended due to hardware malfunction of buggy software. In
both cases the signals (transmitted data, or perceived position) sent by the faulty participants may have a
tremendous impact on the approximated value that is computed by the correct ones. The main criterium for
evaluating the complexity of Approximate Agreement in a particular setting is by providing the maximum
proportion of participants that may exhibit arbitrary behavior in any system execution (w.r.t. the total number
of participants). The other participants are considered to never deviate from their specification.
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The problem becomes even more difficult to solve when faults are mobile. That is, when the faulty
behavior may impact different participants over time. For example, in sensor or mobile robot networks, the
possibility of intermittent external perturbations (e.g. magnetic fields) may affect different processes of the
network at various moments during system execution. Participants that are located in such affected areas
may exhibit Byzantine behavior. Obviously, in these systems the definition of a ”correct” and ”corrupted”
process is not trivial since a correct process may be corrupted temporarily afterwards, while a corrupted
process may behave again according to its specifications, once the external perturbation ceased. When faults
are mobile, every process may exhibit Byzantine behavior in a given system execution. So, complexity
criteria that were valid for the static case must be redesigned from scratch in systems with dynamically
evolving faults.
Our Contribution. This paper considers the Approximate Agreement problem, where processes start with
real values from some interval, and are required to converge, after a sequence of voting rounds, to a set of
values that are within ǫ of each other, where ǫ denotes a (strictly) positive real number. When the envi-
ronment is prone to Byzantine faults, faulty processes may exhibit arbitrary behavior and in particular may
play against the correct ones in order to prevent their convergence. We address the Approximate Agree-
ment problem under the Mobile Byzantine Faults model, where an adversary controls Byzantine agents and
moves them from one process to another. When such an agent is located at a process, this process may
behave arbitrarily (and even maliciously). We consider a round-based synchronous computational model
where the movements of the agents are synchronized with the change of rounds. This paper studies condi-
tions to achieve Approximate Agreement in the four existing synchronous Mobile Byzantine Faults models,
that differ in the diagnosis capabilities of processes, e.g., when processes can diagnose their failure state (that
is, they are aware that the mobile agent has left them), and when processes cannot self-diagnose. We prove
lower bounds (that are different from the static case) on the number of correct processes, n, that is necessary
to achieve Approximate Agreement in the presence of f Mobile Byzantine Faults (that is, f agents) for each
of the four models. Then we extend the correctness proof of the MSR (Mean-Subsequence-Reduce) class
of Approximate Agreement algorithms, [11], to the Mobile Byzantine faults model. Our correctness proof
makes use for the fist time in this context of a mapping between the Mobile Byzantine Faults models and
the Mixed-Mode Faults model [11] composed of asymmetric (classical Byzantine), symmetric and benign
static faults. The benign faults are self-incriminating (immediately self-evident to all non faulty processes).
The behavior of symmetric faults is perceived identically to all correct processes, while the asymmetric
faults have a totally arbitrary behavior. Our mapping is of independent interest and a similar approach can
be used to to prove the correctness of other classical distributed building blocks (e.g. agreement, clock
synchronization, interactive consistency etc) under Mobile Byzantine Faults model.
2 Related Works
The Byzantine Agreement problem, introduced first by Lamport et al. [13] is one of the most studied building
blocks in distributed computing and is specified as the conjunction of the following three properties [12]:
(Termination) All correct processes eventually decide; (Agreement) No two correct processes decide on
different values; (Validity) If all correct processes start with the same value v, then v is the only possible
decision value for a correct process.
In this paper we are interested in the Approximate Byzantine Agreement where processes start with
real numbers as inputs, and eventually decide a real number as output. The difference with the (exact)
Byzantine Agreement is that instead of agreeing exactly, processes are allowed to disagree within a small
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positive margin ǫ. The specification of the Approximate Byzantine Agreement [12] has the same termination
property as the Byzantine Agreement. However, it has different agreement and validity properties: (ǫ-
Agreement) for any ǫ > 0, the decision values of any pair of correct processes are within ǫ of each other;
(Validity) any decision value for a correct process is in the range of the initial values of the correct processes.
2.1 Approximate Byzantine Agreement
The Approximate Byzantine Agreement problem has been studied since the eighties [10, 14]. Most of the
presented solutions are based on successive rounds of exchanges of the latest values each process stores
locally. Upon collecting each set of values, a correct process applies a function (e.g. average) and adopts as
next value the value returned by the function. The interested reader may refer to reference textbooks [12]
and references herein [15, 16].
Allowing different kinds of faults was investigated by Kieckhafer et al. [11], as they unify different algo-
rithms into the class of MSR-algorithms (Mean-Subsequence-Reduced), which compute the mean of a sub-
sequence of the reduced multi-set of values. The authors analyze the convergence rate and the fault-tolerance
of this class of algorithm in a so-called Mixed-Mode faults model. In this model faults are partitioned into
asymmetric (classical Byzantine), symmetric and benign. The benign faults are self-incriminating (immedi-
ately self-evident to all non faulty processes). The behavior of symmetric faults is perceived identically to
all correct processes, while the asymmetric faults have a totally arbitrary behavior. That is, the behavior of
processes being subject to asymmetric faults may be perceived differently by different correct processes.
Stolz et al. [17] recently proposed an Approximate Byzantine Agreement solution where processes have
to approximate the median value of the input values. Their algorithm achieves agreement for n > 3f + 1
within f+1 rounds, where f denotes the number of faulty (a.k.a. Byzantine) processes, while n denotes the
total number of processes. Their algorithm is not included in the MSR-class of [11] since they use a variant
of the King algorithm [18]. Multidimensional agreement has been investigated by Mendes et al. [19, 20],
where the authors also highlight the connexion between approximate agreement and convergence in mobile
autonomous robot networks [1, 2]. Li et al. [4] and Charron-Bost et al. [3] consider extensions to dynamic
networks. In a sustained line of work, Tseng et al. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] investigate approximate agreement problem
within various faults models (link crash, process crash, byzantine) in multi-hop networks (both for the
directed and the undirected cases).
2.2 Mobile Byzantine Faults
As singled out by Yung [21], it is worth considering mobile adversaries (a.k.a. Byzantine mobile agents).
Mobile adversaries have been primarily introduced in the context of multi-party computation, to model an
attacker or an adversarial environment that is able to progressively compromise computational entities, but
only for a limited period of time. Therefore, tolerating Mobile Byzantine Faults is, in some sense, like
having a bounded number of compromised entities at any given time but the set of such entities evolves over
time.
From a theoretical point of view, mobile adversaries have been formalized for different Mobile Byzantine
Faults models [22, 23, 24, 25]. In Mobile Byzantine Faults models, there are two main research directions:
(i) Byzantines with constrained mobility, and (ii) Byzantines with unconstrained mobility. Byzantines with
constraint mobility were first studied by Buhrman et al. [23]. In their paper, they consider that Byzantine
agents move from one node to another only when protocol messages are sent (similarly to how viruses would
propagate). Buhrman et al. [23] studied the problem of Mobile Byzantine Agreement. They proved a tight
3
bound for the problem solvability (i.e., n > 3t, where t is the maximal number of simultaneously faulty
processes), and proposed a time optimal protocol that matches this bound.
In the case of unconstrained mobility the motion of Byzantine agents is not tied to protocol message
exchanges. Several authors investigated the agreement problem in further variants of this model [26, 22, 24,
27, 28, 25]. Reischuk [28] investigates the stability/stationarity of malicious agents for a given period of
time. Ostrovsky and Yung [27] introduce the notion of mobile virus and investigate an adversary that can
inject and distribute faults. Furthermore, they advocate that the unconstraint mobility model abstracts the
concept of insider threats (hacker, cracker, black hat) or attacks (DOS, Worms, viruses or Trojan horses).
Garay [24] and, more recently, Banu et al. [26], Sasaki et al. [25], and Bonnet et al. [22] consider, in
their models, that processes execute synchronous rounds composed of three phases: send, receive, compute.
Between two consecutive rounds, Byzantine agents can move from one node to another, hence the set of
faulty processes has a bounded size although its members can change from one round to the next. The
main difference between the aforementioned unconstrained models lies in the knowledge that processes that
have been affected by a Byzantine agent have. In Garay’s model, a process has the ability to detect its own
infection after the Byzantine agent left it. More precisely, during the first round following the leave of the
Byzantine agent, a process enters a state, called cured, during which it can take preventive actions to avoid
sending messages that are based on a corrupted state. Garay [24] proposed, in this model, an algorithm that
solves Byzantine Agreement provided that n > 6f (this requirement was later dropped to n > 4f [26]).
Bonnet et al. [22] investigated the same problem in a model where processes do not have the ability to
detect when Byzantine agents have moved. However, differently from Sasaki et al. [25], cured processes
have control on the messages they send. This subtle difference on the power of Byzantine agents has an
impact on the bounds for solving the agreement. If in the Sasaki’s model the bound on solving agreement is
n > 6f , in Bonnet’s model it decreases to n > 5f , and this bound is proven tight.
3 System Model and Problem Definition
We consider a distributed system composed of a set of n processes P = {p1, p2, . . . pn} each having a
unique integer identifier i ∈ [1, n].
Communication model and timing assumptions. Processes communicate through message passing. It is
assumed that processes in the distributed system may access a built-in communication abstraction used to
disseminate messages to all the other processes. We assume that communications are authenticated (i.e.,
given a message m, the identity of its sender cannot be forged) and reliable (i.e. messages are not created,
lost or duplicated).
The system is synchronous and evolves in sequential synchronous rounds r0, r1, . . . ri . . . . Every round
is divided in three phases: (i) send where processes send all the messages for the current round, (ii) receive
where processes receive all the messages sent at the beginning of the current round1 and (iii) computation
where processes process received messages and prepare those that are sent in the next round.
Failure model. Processes are affected by mobile Byzantine failures (MBF) [22, 24, 23, 25]. Informally, in
the mobile Byzantine failure model, faults are represented by powerful computationally unbounded agents
that move arbitrarily from a process to another. When the agent is on the process, it can corrupt its local
variables, forces it to send arbitrary messages (potentially different from process to process) etc... However,
the agent cannot corrupt the identity of the process. We assume that, in each round ri, at most f processes
1Let us note that, in round-based computations, all messages are delivered during the receive phase.
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can be affected by a mobile Byzantine failure. When an agent occupies a process pi we say that pi is faulty.
If a process has been occupied by a Byzantine agent in the previous round then the process is said to be
cured. If a process is neither faulty nor cured then it is said to be correct. We assume, similar to previous
work [22, 24, 25], that each process has a tamper-proof memory where it safely stores the correct algorithm
code. When the agent leaves a process pi, it becomes cured and then can recover the correct algorithm
code from the tamper-proof memory. Concerning the assumptions on agent movements and the process
awareness on its cured state, different models have been defined. In this paper we consider all the variants
of mobile Byzantine failures [22, 24, 23, 25]:
• (M1) Garay’s model [24]. In this model, agents can move arbitrarily from a process to another at the
beginning of each round (i.e. before the send phase starts). When a process is in the cured state it is
aware of its condition and thus can remain silent for a round to prevent the dissemination of wrong
information.
• (M2) Bonnet et al.’s model [22] and (M3) Sasaki et al.’s model [25]. As in the previous model, agents
can move arbitrarily from a process to another at the beginning of each round (i.e. before the send
phase starts). Differently from the Garay’s model, in both models it is assumed that processes do not
know if they are correct or cured when the Byzantine agent moved. The main difference between
these two models is that in the [25] model a cured process still acts as a Byzantine one extra round.
• (M4) Buhrman’s model [23]. Differently from the previous models, agents move together with the
message (i.e., with the send or broadcast operation). However, when a process is in the cured state it
is aware of that.
Byzantine Approximate Agreement specification. The Byzantine Approximate Agreement problem has
been accurately specified in [12]. Processes start with real-valued inputs and eventually decide a real-valued
output. The only difference with the exact Byzantine Agreement is that instead of agreeing exactly, processes
are allowed to disagree within a small positive real-valued tolerance ǫ.
• Termination: All non faulty processes eventually decide;
• ǫ-Agreement: The decision value of any pair of non faulty processes are within ǫ of each other;
• Validity: Any decision value for a non faulty process is in the range of the initial values of the non
faulty processes.
Note that the specification proposed in [13] is similar (the termination properties being included in the
agreement properties).
4 Mapping Mobile Byzantine Faults to Mixed-model Faults Model
In this paper, we extend the analysis done in [11] for mixed-faults model and prove that the family of
Mean-Subsequence-Reduce (MRS) algorithms works also in the Mobile Byzantine Faults models.
In this section, we provide some background notions from [11] and propose an elegant mapping between
the Mobile Byzantine Faults model and the Mixed-Mode faults.
The work in [11] is focused on a specific family of Byzantine Approximate Agreement algorithms,
namely convergent voting algorithms, that start from an initial set of proposed values {v1, v2, . . . vn} and
guarantee that any process pi converges to a value vi satisfying the Byzantine Approximate Agreement
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specification. More in details, any algorithm in this family proceeds in rounds and during any round rj ,
every process pi executes the following actions:
1. send-phase: pi sends its “voted” value to the others;
2. received-phase: pi aggregates values in a multiset Nrk ;
3. computation-phase: pi applies a deterministic function F(Nrk) to decide the value to vote in the next
round rk+1.
In [11] convergent voting algorithms are called Mean-Subsequence-Reduce (MSR). Their computation
function can be expressed in the general form:
FMSR(Nrk) = mean[Sel(Red(Nrk ))]
where Sel is a selection function and Red is a reduction function used to filter values.
The correctness of MSR algorithms in the Mixed-mode faults model is guaranteed by the single-step
convergence property. Informally, at the end of each round rk, the range of values voted by correct processes
shrinks with respect to the beginning of the round. The failures considered in [11] are benign, symmetric
and asymmetric with the definitions below.
Definition 1 (Benign fault [11]) A process pi is said to be benign faulty if it exposes a self-incriminating,
or immediately self-evident fault to all non-faulty processes.
An example of benign fault is a crash failure or an omitted reply in a synchronous system. That is, in syn-
chronous systems if the reply is not delivered within the expected time then the process can be immediately
detected as faulty by every correct process .
Definition 2 (Symmetric fault [11]) A process pi is said to be symmetrically faulty if its behavior is per-
ceived identically by all non-faulty processes.
A symmetric fault is generally a malicious fault such as unexpected message broadcast to all processes.
Definition 3 (Asymmetric fault [11]) A process pi is said to be asymmetrically faulty if its behavior may
be perceived differently by different non-faulty processes.
An asymmetric fault is a classical arbitrary fault such as a broadcast where the sender can send different
values to different correct processes.
In [11], the authors proved that, given the number of benign faults b, the number of symmetric faults s
and the number of asymmetric faults a, the minimum number of processes n needed to solve the Byzantine
Approximate Agreement by an algorithm in the class MSR is n > 3a+ 2s+ b.
In the following, we propose a method to map the Mobile Byzantine faults model to the Mixed-mode
faults then prove that the MSR algorithms are correct under the Mobile Byzantine fault model. In addition,
we compute the number of processes n needed to tolerate f Mobile Byzantine faulty processes and solve
the Byzantine Approximate Agreement problem under Mobile Byzantine faults model.
Note that the behavior of mobile Byzantines concerns only the send/receive phases of the MSR algo-
rithms. Therefore, we focus on the behavior of the faulty processes during the execution of these phases. In
order to match our models the send-phase of MSR algorithms should be sightly modified in order to prevent
correct processes to participate to the communication as per the requirement of the M1 model.
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Lemma 1 Let T brk be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk in model M1. If the send
phase
if (cured) nop; else send(vote) to all processes;
is executed by any pj ∈ T brk then the computation executed in round rk is equivalent to the computation
under Mixed-mode fault model with a = f and b = |T brk |.
Proof A cured process, in M1 is aware of its failure state thus if it is forced to skip the send phase then it is
detected by any correct process in round rk. ✷Lemma 1
Lemma 2 Let T srk be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk in model M2. If the send
phase
send(vote) to all processes;
is executed by any pj ∈ T srk then the computation executed in round rk is equivalent to the computation
under Mixed-mode fault model executed with a = f and s = |T srk |.
Proof A cured process in M2 is not aware of its state, hence it sends its vote to every process in the system.
This value may be the result of a corrupted state. This is identical to the behavior of a process exhibiting a
symmetric fault. ✷Lemma 3
Lemma 3 Let T ark be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk in model M3. If send phase
send(vote) to all processes;
is executed by any pj ∈ T ark then the computation executed in round rk is equivalent to the computation
under Mixed-mode fault model executed with a = f + |T ark |.
Proof A cured process in M3 is not aware of its state hence it sends its vote to every process in the system.
Moreover, Byzantine agent prepares the outgoing message queue (cf. [25]). Thus, a cured process executes
the sending phase as any correct process. However, differently from the correct processes it sends possibly
different values (left behind by the Byzantine agent) to every process in the system. This is identical to the
behavior of a process exhibiting an asymmetric fault. ✷Lemma 3
Lemma 4 Let T crk be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk in model M4. If the send
phase
send(vote) to all processes;
is executed by any pj ∈ T crk then the computation executed in round rk is equivalent to the computation
under Mixed-mode fault model executed with a = f .
Proof In this failure model, Byzantine agents move along with the messages. Thus during the sending
phase there are no processes in T crk . ✷Lemma 4
Table 1 summarizes the mapping results proven in Lemmas 1-4. Table 2 reports the required number of
replicas for each model.
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M1 M2 M3 M4
Asymmetric faulty faulty faulty, cured faulty
Symmetric cured
Benign cured
Table 1: Mapping between the behavior of faulty processes in the Mixed-Mode faulty model and faulty and
cured processes in the four Mobile Byzantine faulty models.
nMi
M1 n > 3f + b = 4f
M2 n > 3f + 2s = 5f
M3 n > 3(f + a) = 6f
M4 n > 3f = 3f
Table 2: Number of required replicas in each failure model.
5 MSR under Mobile Byzantine Faults
In the following we prove that in presence of mobile Byzantine agents the MSR family of algorithms ver-
ifies the Byzantine Approximate Agreement specification. We first characterize configurations produced
by a MSR algorithm in presence of static Byzantine faulty nodes. Then, we prove that each configuration
produced in presence of mobile Byzantine agents has the same characterization. Hence, the mobility of
Byzantine agents does not affect the correctness of MSR family. Moreover, we prove that the necessary
condition over the number of replicas in [11] still holds in the Mobile Byzantine failures model with the
mapping defined in the previous section.
5.1 Preliminaries
In the following we recall some definitions from [10, 11] :
• min(V): min(r ∈ R : V (r) > 0) = v1; the minimum value of the elements in V ;
• max(V): max(r ∈ R : V (r) > 0) = vv; the maximum value of the elements in V ;
• ρ(V ): [min(V ),max(V )] = [v1, vv]; the real interval spanned by V. ρ(V ) is called the range of V;
• δ(V ): min(V )−max(V ) = v1− vv; the difference between the maximum and the minimum values
of V . δ(V ) is called the diameter of V;
• N irk : the multiset of values received in a given round rk by non-faulty process i. Let U : be the subset
of N irk , the values generated by non-faulty processes
2
.
Now we can recall the important properties of FMSR() as proved in [11]. If n > 3a + 2s + b then the
following two properties hold:
P1 For each non faulty process pi, the computed value is in the range of non faulty values, i.e.,FMSR(N irk) ∈
ρ(U).
2Since the communication graph is fully connected then this set is equal for any correct process
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P2 For each pair of non faulty processes, pi and pj , the difference between their computed values is
strictly less than the diameter of the submultiset of non faulty values received, i.e., |FMSR(N irk) −
FMSR(N
j
rk)| < δ(U).
In the following virk denotes the value obtained at the end of round rk (computation phase) by process pi,
applying the MSR function vector N irk .
Definition 4 (correct value) Given a value virk ← FMSR(N irk), virk is said to be correct if it respects the
two FMSR() function properties P1 and P2.
Lemma 5 Let T ∗rk be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk in the models M1-M4. If
n > nMi and every pj ∈ T ∗rk executes computation-phase of a MSR-algorithm then at the end of rk we
have |T ∗rk | = 0.
Proof The proof is done by induction. During the first round r0 no Byzantine agent moved yet. Thus, at the
end of r0 trivially |T ∗r0 | = 0. In the next round r1 Byzantine agents move thus affecting up to f processes.
Therefore, at the beginning of r1 there are up to f cured processes, |T ∗r1 | ≤ f . If we substitute, for each
model M1-M4 (cf. Table 1), values in n > 3a+ 2s + b if follows that despite agents movement, n > nMi
still holds. Thus, for the definition of FMSR() the value that each process computes at computation-phase
is correct. Hence, at the end of round r1 we have |T ∗r1 | = 0. For each further rk the reasoning is similar.
✷Lemma 5
From Lemma 5 it follows that during each round there are not cured processes related to the previous
round but only the ones due to the last Byzantine agents movement, hence the corollary below.
Corollary 1 Let Trk be the set of cured processes at the beginning of round rk. ∀rk, |Trk | ≤ f .
Definition 5 (configuration Crk ) Let configuration Crk be a set of n tuples 〈failure state, proposing value〉i
representing the state of each process pi at round rk. Note that processes, depending on the failure model,
may or may not be aware of their failure state.
Definition 6 (AArk ) LetAA be a generic instance of the MSR family and let AArk be the rk−th execution
of the protocol AA at round rk, such that Crk ← AArk(Crk−1). It takes as input Crk−1 and returns Crk .
Definition 7 (static computation) A sequence of k AA executions, such that Crk ← AArk−1(AArk−2(. . .
AAr1(Cr0)) . . . ) is said a static computation if in every configuration Cr1 , ..., Crk , there exists a subset of
at least n− (3a+ 2s+ b) correct processes that are correct during the whole computation.
Note that with fixed a,s and b, the relation n > 3a + 2s + b always holds in a static computation of a
MSR algorithm ([11]).
Definition 8 (mobile computation) A sequence of kAA executions, such that Crk ← AArk−1(AArk−2(. . .
AAr1(Cr0)) . . . ) is said to be a mobile computation if for any two subsequent configurations Crk , Crk+1,
any process may change the failure state but the relation n > 3a+ 2s+ b holds at each round.
Definition 9 (configurations equivalence) A configuration Crk is said to be equivalent to a configuration
C¯rk if:
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• Crk and C¯rk produce the same U ;
• ∀k, Crk has at least the same number of tuples 〈correct, correct value 〉 as C¯rk .
Note that in a static computation a correct process is correct for the whole computation, while in a mobile
one is correct with respect to the observed round.
Definition 10 (correct computation) A computation Cr0 , . . . , Crk is a correct computation if it is possible
to build a static computation C¯r0 , . . . , C¯rk such that, ∀j ∈ [0, k], Crj is equivalent to C¯rj .
Observation 1 [11] Given a static computation C¯r0 , . . . , C¯rk of an algorithm in the MSR class, if n >
3a+ 2s+ b, then each configuration C¯rj , j ∈ [0, k], is characterized as follows:
• up to a asymmetric Byzantine processes;
• up to s symmetric Byzantine processes;
• up to b benign faults;
• at least n− (a+ s+ b) correct processes such that each pj of them computes a correct value vrjj .
The first three points are due to the failures static nature. The last one is given by the failures static
nature plus the correctness of the algorithm in the static case (as proven in [11]).
5.2 MSR correctness under Mobile Byzantine fault model
In the following we prove that despite Byzantines mobility, the MSR family of algorithms verifies the Ap-
proximate Agreement specification. In the presence of mobile Byzantine agents, each round is characterized
by correct, cured and faulty processes. As we showed previously, depending on the failure model considered,
cured processes behave accordingly to a different kind of fault (asymmetric, symmetric or benign).
The following theorem proves the mapping between the Mobile Byzantine faults model and the Mixed-
mode fault model. Let us start proving that if n > nMi then a mobile computation is also a correct compu-
tation, as defined in subsection 5.1.
Theorem 1 Let us consider a mobile computation C0, . . . , Ck,∀k ∈ N of an algorithm AA in the class
MSR. If in each round n > nMi (cf. Table 2) then the sequence C0, . . . , Ck is a correct computation.
Proof We have to show that for each iteration of AA we can build a static computation equivalent to the
dynamic one. The proof is done by induction. Let us denote by C, T ∗ and B the set of correct, cured and
Byzantine processes respectively and let t∗ denote the cardinality of T ∗. Let us denote, in the static case,
by C′, T ′, and B′ the set of correct, non correct (which may be asymmetric, symmetric, or benign), and
asymmetric faulty processes, respectively, and let t′∗ denote the cardinality of T ′.
• Rounds 0 → 1: At the begining of round 0, Byzantine agents never move. Thus, the configuration is
as follows:
– C: ∀i ∈ C, 〈correct, viniti 〉i, |C| ≥ n− (f);
– B: ∀j ∈ B, 〈faulty,⊥ 3 〉j , |B| ≤ f .
3We use ⊥ to indicate that it can be any value
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The protocol executes its first iteration. Processes exchange their value and each non Byzantine
process pi updates its state: 〈failure state, proposing value ← v0i = FMSR(V 0)〉 . At this point
the situation is as follow:
– C: ∀i ∈ C, 〈correct, v0i 〉i, |C| ≥ n− (f);
– B: ∀j ∈ B, 〈faulty,⊥〉j , |B| ≤ f .
Up to now, the same happens in a static computation. At the begining of round 1, at most f Byzantine
agents move affecting other processes. Thus there are up to t∗ = f cured processes storing a non
correct value (e.g., v0 /∈ ρ(N0)).
– C: ∀i ∈ C, 〈correct, viniti 〉i, |C| ≥ n− (f + t∗);
– T : ∀k ∈ T , 〈cured,⊥〉k , |T | ≤ t∗;
– B: ∀j ∈ B, 〈faulty,⊥〉j , |B| ≤ f .
At the begining of round 1, there are at least n − (f + t∗) correct processes. If we map it to the
Mixed-mode failures model (cf. Table 1), this is equivalent to a static configuration where there are f
asymmetric processes and t∗ non correct that may be asymmetric, symmetric or benign:
– C′: ∀i ∈ C′, 〈correct, viniti 〉i, |C
′| ≥ n− (f + t′∗);
– T ′: ∀k ∈ T ′, 〈∗,⊥〉k , |T
′| ≤ t′∗;
– B′: ∀j ∈ B′, 〈asymmetric,⊥〉j , |B
′| ≤ f .
The mobile and static configurations are equivalent (cf. Observation 1). Thus the current mobile
configuration (and the mobile computation up to now) is correct.
• Rounds 1 → 2: From the previous point, the configuration at the beginning of round 1 is correct. The
second iteration of the protocol takes place. Processes exchange their value and each non Byzantine
process pi updates its state: 〈failure state, proposing value ← v1i = FMSR(N1i )〉. At this point, for
Lemma 5, each process in T ∗ becomes correct. In other words, there are up to f Byzantine processes
and at least n− f correct processes. We are in the same situation as at the end of previous round 0.
At the beginning of next round, at most f Byzantine agents can move to other processes, leaving up to
t∗ = f cured processes with non correct value. Thus there are at least n− (f + t∗) correct processes
at the begining of round 2. The mobile and static configurations are equivalent (cf. Observation 1).
Thus the current mobile configuration (and the mobile computation up to now) is correct.
• Rounds i→ i+1: generalizing, for each round starting with a correct configuration we can apply the
previous reasoning ending in a subsequent round characterized by a correct configuration.
✷Theorem 1
In the following we prove the correctness of any algorithm in the class MSR under Mobile Byzantine
failure model.
Lemma 6 (Termination) Let AA be an algorithm in the class MSR. If n > nMi, AA under Mobile Byzan-
tine fault model verifies the Termination property of the Byzantine Approximation Agreement.
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Proof From Theorem 1, if n > nMi then algorithm AA generates a sequence of correct configurations, i.e.,
a sequence of converging values exactly as in [10, 11], thus the Termination property is satisfied in the same
way this is satisfied by the [10, 11] solutions. ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7 (ǫ-Agreement) Let AA be an algorithm in the class MSR. If n > nMi, AA under Mobile Byzan-
tine fault model verifies the ǫ-Agreement property of the Byzantine Approximation Agreement.
Proof From Theorem 1, if n > nMi then algorithm AA generates a sequence of correct configurations, i.e.,
a sequence of converging values exactly as in [10, 11]. Thus, the ǫ-Agreement property is satisfied in the
same way this is satisfied by the [10, 11] solutions.
In the following we prove that once ǫ-Agreement is achieved among the currently non faulty processors,
it is preserved among the (possible different) uninfected processors. Let us consider an arbitrarily long
mobile computation C0, . . . , Ck. If ǫ-Agreement is achieved then there exists a round ra, a ∈ [0, k] where
all non faulty processes agree on values that are ǫ close to each other. Considering that n > nMi then
from Theorem 1 the whole mobile computation C0, . . . , Ck is correct. Thus from round to round the two
properties P1 and P2 hold and correct processes values can not diverge from each other.
✷Lemma 7
Lemma 8 (Validity) Let AA be an algorithm in the class MSR. If n > nMi, AA under Mobile Byzantine
fault model verifies the Validity property of the Byzantine Approximation Agreement.
Proof From Theorem 1, if n > nMi then algorithm AA generates a sequence of correct configurations, i.e.,
a sequence of converging values exactly as in the validity proof in [10, 11]. ✷Lemma 8
The three above lemmas provide the proof of the theorem below.
Theorem 2 If n > nMi then the class MSR verifies the Byzantine Approximate Agreement specification.
6 Lower Bounds
In order to formulate the strongest impossibility results related to Approximate Agreement in the Mobile
Byzantine faults model we examine a weaker version of this problem referred in [14] as Simple Approximate
Agreement. Each correct node has a real value from [0, 1] as input and chooses a real value. Correct behav-
iors must satisfy the following properties: Agreement: The maximum difference between values chosen by
correct nodes must be strictly smaller than the maximum difference between the inputs, or be equal to the
latter difference if it is zero. Validity: Each correct node chooses a value in the range of the inputs of the
nodes.
We prove lower bounds for each Mobile Byzantine faults models: Garay’s (M1), Bonnet’s(M2), Sasaki’s
(M3) and Burhman’s (M4). The bounds for the models (M3) and (M4) result from the classical bounds
proved in [14] and the mapping defined in Section 3. In the case of models (M1) and (M2), since the
behavior of cured processes cannot be totally controlled by the Byzantine adversary, specific proofs are
needed.
Observation 2 Note that the lower bounds below do not concern the class of algorithms whose compu-
tations end before the end of the first round and that start in a configuration where there are f Byzantine
processes and no cured ones. It is trivial that for this class of algorithms the lower bounds are the same as
those proven in [14] (i.e., n ≥ 3f + 1).
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Theorem 3 (Lower bound for Garay’s model) There is no algorithm that solves Simple Approximate Agree-
ment in the Garay’s model (M1) under the Mobile Byzantine faults model if n ≤ 4f .
Proof The proof goes by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an algorithm A verifying the Simple
Approximate Agreement properties in the (M1) Mobile Byzantine faults model with n ≤ 4f . Consider
w.l.g. a system with four processes and one Byzantine mobile agent. The generalization of the proof can be
done by replacing any process with a group of f processes.
Consider the system with four processes denoted p0, p1, p2, p3 and consider that p0 is occupied by the
Byzantine agent while p1 is cured and p2 and p3 are correct processes. Note that the cured process in (M1)
model is silent. Consider three executions of A denoted E1, E2 and E3 constructed as follows. In E1 the
correct processes propose both the value 0. It follows, from the Agreement and Validy properties of A, that
the value chosen by p1, p2 and p3 should be 0 (independently of the value sent by the Byzantine process,
assume it 1). In E2 the correct processes propose both 1. It follows, from the Agreement and Validity
properties ofA, that the value chosen by p1, p2 and p3 is 1 (independently of the value sent by the Byzantine
process, assume it 0).
The E3 brings the contradiction: some correct processes choose 1 while others choose 0, which contra-
dicts the Agreement property of A. The execution E3 is as follows: the process occupied by the Byzantine
agent sends 0 to process p2 and 1 to process p3. Let us consider only the processes p2 and p3. The multiset
held by p2 is {0,0,1}. This multiset is identical with the one p2 gathered in E1, hence its choice in E3
should be 0 (identical to the one in E1). The multiset gathered by p3 in E3 is {1,0,1} and identical with the
one p3 gathered in E2. Thus, p3 should choose 1 in E3. Execution E3 violates the Agreement property of
Simple Approximate Agreement. This contradicts the assumption that A verifies the Simple Approximate
Agreement properties. ✷Theorem 6
Theorem 4 (Lower bound for Bonnet’s model) There is no algorithm that solves Simple Approximate
Agreement in the Bonnet’s model (M2) under the Mobile Byzantine faults model if n ≤ 5f .
Proof The proof follows the same general idea as the proof of Theorem . Suppose that exists an algorithm
A verifying Simple Approximate Agreement properties in Mobile Byzantine model (M2) with n ≤ 5f . In
all of them we consider five processes p0, p1, p2, p3 and p4, where p0 is occupied by a Byzantine agent while
p1 is cured (its state may be corrupted) and p2, p3 and p4 are correct processes.
Consider three executions: E1, E2 and E3. Execution E1 starts in a configuration where p2, p3 and p4
propose 0 while p1 proposes 1. Assume p0 sends 1 to all processes. Each non faulty process gathers in E1
the multi-set {1,1,0,0,0} and following the Agreement and Validity properties of A , they have all to choose
0 in E1.
Execution E2 starts in a configuration where p2, p3 and p4 propose 1 while p1 proposes 0. Assume p0
sends 0 to all processes. Each non faulty process gathers in E2 the multi-set {0,0,1,1,1} and following the
Agreement and Validity properties of A , they have all to choose 1 in E2.
Execution E3 brings the contradiction. Assume that in E3 p0 sends 0 to p2 and 1 to p3. p2 gathers
the multiset {1,1,0,0,0} hence it has the same multi-set as in E1. p2 then chooses 0. p3 gathers the multi-
set {0,0,1,1,1} and since this multi-set is identical with the one gathered in E2, p3 has to make the same
choice, namely 1. Execution E3 violates the Agreement property, hence A do not implement the Simple
Approximate Agreement. ✷Theorem 4
Theorem 5 (Lower bound for Sasaki’s model) There is no algorithm that solves Simple Approximate Agree-
ment in the Sasaki’s model (M3) under the Mobile Byzantine faults model if n ≤ 6f .
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Proof The proof follows directly from the lower bound for the Simple Approximate Agreement [14] and the
mapping defined in Section 3. Note that in the Sasaski’s model the number of processes with asymmetric
behavior is 2f where f is the number of Byzantine agents. ✷Theorem 5
Theorem 6 (Lower bound for Burhman’s model) There is no algorithm that solves Simple Approximate
Agreement in the Burhman’s model (M4) under the Mobile Byzantine faults model if n ≤ 3f .
Proof The proof follows directly from the lower bound for Simple Approximate Agreement [14] and the
mapping defined in Section 4. Note that in the Burhman’s model in each round there are exactly f asym-
metric faulty processes. ✷Theorem 6
7 Conclusions
This paper proves lower and upper bounds for achieving Approximate Agreement in the Mobile Byzantine
faults model. Our core technique is the first mapping between variants of Mobile Byzantine faults models,
and the Mixed-mode faults model [11]. Our mapping then permitted to prove that the class of MSR (Mean-
Subsequence-Reduce) Approximate Agreement algorithms are correct in the Mobile Byzantine faults model.
We believe that our technique can be reused for other classical problems in Byzantine fault tolerance (e.g.
agreement, clock synchronization, interactive consistency etc).
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